NATO’s Eastern Flank Strengthens Borders and Security in Response to Growing Hybrid Threats
In April 2025, Finnish President Alexander Stubb announced Finland’s intention to withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty, an international agreement prohibiting the possession, trade, and use of anti-personnel landmines. Finland’s Minister of Defense elaborated on the decision, stating that “leaving the Ottawa Treaty will allow us to respond more flexibly to changes in the regional security environment,” pointing to the fundamental shift in Europe’s security landscape, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Tensions have continued to rise along Finland’s 1,340-kilometer border with Russia, particularly as, in late 2024 and early 2025, Russia began upgrading and reinforcing its nearby border bases, constructing new military warehouses and hangars focused on logistics and maintenance. This marks its first major investment in the area in years. Although most equipment from these bases continues to be sent to the Ukrainian front and the development is not viewed as an immediate threat, it nonetheless signals a shift in posture and warrants caution.
In doing so, Finland joins the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, along with Poland, which announced their own intent to withdraw from the treaty several weeks earlier in a joint declaration. Though not officially stated, the goal appears to be to enable strategic flexibility in deploying landmines to protect their borders with Russia and its ally Belarus, with fears of a potential large-scale military incursion in the near future. These countries, forming NATO’s vulnerable eastern flank and encompassing strategic transit routes, have begun to deploy advanced, multilayered security systems along their borders with Russia, in addition to traditional fencing. These systems include the use of drones for surveillance, as well as the establishment of communication and electronic warfare systems aimed at countering GPS disruptions caused by Russian interference with NATO communications.
Another defensive step taken by Finland in early 2025 was the passing of a new Cyber Defense Law. This law requires providers of critical infrastructure, such as transportation, finance, and healthcare, to implement routine security procedures for risk management, vulnerability identification, and real-time reporting of significant breaches or cyberattacks to authorities. Following this move, Russia intensified its hybrid campaign against Finland, including cyberattacks on the energy grid and public sector, often coordinated with disinformation efforts aimed at weakening public trust and disrupting national stability. These attacks follow a pattern of disruptions that began shortly after Finland joined NATO in 2023.
These defensive measures by Finland and its neighbors bordering Russia come during an ongoing and troubling rise in suspected Russian sabotage efforts across Europe, particularly in countries bordering Russia. Russia’s actions along the border, including military expansion, are part of a broader hybrid warfare strategy, intended to destabilize NATO countries through ambiguous disruptive activities that fall short of clear-cut military aggression. As previously noted in articles and declared by NATO officials, Russia continues employ hybrid tactics such as cyberattacks, disinformation, strategic military buildups, and physical sabotage.
As security tensions rise across Europe, Finland and its NATO eastern flank neighbors have come to recognize that physical borders alone are insufficient. They are now working to build multilayered defense systems that integrate physical infrastructure, advanced technologies like
drones and electronic warfare, and modern legislation such as the new Cyber Defense Law. The increased Russian presence along the borders and ongoing hybrid attacks blur the lines of escalation and require a rapid response capability to maintain national stability and functionality during crises.
Additionally, the withdrawal from the international agreement banning the use, possession, and trade of landmines shows a shift in regional security policy. While this move aligns with emerging trends among NATO’s eastern members, it reignites debate over balancing between security needs and humanitarian obligations. In effect, this withdrawal reflects a fundamental change in how democratic nations are dealing with such threats, driven by a concrete sense of danger. These countries no longer see the treaty as adequately addressing today’s security challenges and are prioritizing strategic flexibility over humanitarian commitments in a shifting geopolitical reality.
In light of the above, critical sectors – such as transportation, energy, healthcare, and finance – in Eastern and Central Europe remain under ongoing threat from Russia and have proven particularly vulnerable to hybrid attacks that include both physical sabotage and cyber intrusions. This reality demands a renewed security policy and tighter management of supply chains, alongside stronger cyber defense. To effectively address these evolving threats, governments across the region, together with private sector partners, must adopt a multilayered security approach, combining cyber defense, physical security, intelligence sharing, and the implementation of advanced risk management strategies. The need to protect critical infrastructure against complex, unpredictable threats with potentially far-reaching impacts has become urgent and essential to strengthening national resilience and civilian security in today’s Europe.
At ASERO Worldwide, our extensive experience in protecting critical infrastructure, enhancing cyber resilience, and conducting threat analysis and response planning enables us to deliver holistic security solutions tailored to today’s evolving threat environment.